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AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF LARGE GROUP
BARGAINING IN A MARKET GAME
J. Keith Murnighan and Alvin E. Roth
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Abstract
The present paper addresses coalition behavior both from a social
psychological and a game theoretic perspective. Between seven and twelve
players participated in a market game where one player was a monopolist.
Five conditions allowed for analysis of the effects of the announcement
of the payoff division, the announcement of the players' offers, and the
availability of comiminication. The results were compared to bargaining
theory (Komorita and Chertkoff , 1973) , the weighted probability model
(Komorita, 1974)
,
pivotal power theory (Gamson, 1964) , and to the game
theoretic concepts of the core and the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953). The
results indicc :ed that the monopolist' 3 payoffs increase"! over trials and
•approached the core, especially in the no message conditions. The message
conditions supported the predictions of the weighted probability model and
pivotal power theory. The results were also compared to earlier research
on a similar three-person game; increasing the group size markedly increased
the monopolist's payoffs. In addition, his position was so strong that his
demands, especially in the no message conditions, almost strictly determined
his payoffs.
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AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF LARGE GROUP
BARGAINING IN A K^RKET GAME
J. Keith Mumighan and Alvin E. Roth
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Two areas of inquiry have stressed the importance of coalition
formation in conflict situations. N-person game theory has approached
coalition behavior from a mathematical-economic point of view (e.g.,
von Neumann and Morgenstem, 1944) while social psychology has approached
the problem from a sociological point of view (e.g., Caplow, 1956; Gamson,
1961) . Only recently have the two approaches been considered together
(e.g., Michener, and Sakurai, 1976). The present paper
continues this effort to bridge the two areas by considering both social
psychological theory and mathematical game theory as potential predictors
of the bargaining outcomes within large groups.
A previov j paper (Mumighan and I ^th, 1976 ) consi lered the effects
.of communication and inforroation availability in a three-person market game
in which one player had a monopoly. Although the two weaker players could
not attain any payoff by themselves, if they could coordinate their actions
they could block the attainment of any payoffs by the monopolist. The
results indicated that the monopolist's payoffs were significantly reduced
when the players were given the opportunity to send messages. In addition,
the announcement of the payoff division resulting from each of the agree-
ments also tended to reduce the monopolist's payoffs, while the announcement
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of which offers were accepted and rejected by each of the players tended
to increase tl-»j payoffs of the monopol i.st.
The results were also compared to several game theoretic solution
concepts. In particular, the data were compared to the core (cf . , Luce
and Raiffa, 1957), where the monopolist would receive the entire payoff
(100 points). The mean payoffs in the six different communication/infor-
mation availability conditions, however, ranged from 56 to 77. Even
though the results did not reach the core, the monopolist's payoffs
increased as the rules of the game restricted the availeibility of infor-
mation and/or communication. Thus, the notion that the core results from
con^setitive play of the game was not completely unsupported.
The present study atteitqpted to further delineate the conditions
,
which would be conducive to greater competition among the weaker players
and, therefore, increased payoffs for the monopolist. The major change
between the present and the previous study was in the number of weak
players. While the previous study considered a situation with the smal-
lest possible number of weak players (i.e., two), the present study con-
sidered a situation where there v;ere anywhere from 6 to 11 weak players.
Manipulation of group size to increase the competitiveness of the game
(at least for games with one strong player) is consistant with both social
psychological theory (e.g., Komorita, 1974) and game theoretic results in
the economic literature. In a niunber of contexts, it has been shown that
as the number of players in a market game becomes large, the set of outcomes
in the core become identified with the competitive equilibria of the market
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(cf. Debreu amd Scarf, 1963; Aumann, 1964). This supports the view that
outcomes in tl ; core result from compc -itive play of the game.
A related point of view is that the game itself becomes more competi-
tive as the number of players increases. Indeed, the Shapley value of a
market with many players becomes identified with the competitive equili-
bria and the core (cf. Aumann, 1975; Aumann and Shapley, 1971; Champsaur,
1975; Shapley, 1953). It has been recently demonstrated (cf. Roth, 1976)
that the Shapley value is a risk-neutral cardinal utility fxinction which
reflects a player's preference for playing a given position in the game.
In other words, the Shapley value represents the expected outcome for a
player, before the game is played. Thus, the identification of the Shapley
value with the competitive outcomes in a geime suggests that the a-priori
evaluation of the game is that it will result in a coinpetitive outcome.
Among the social psychological theories, Komorita's (1974) Weighted
Probability model assumes that small coalitions (i.e., those with few, mem-
bers) are more likely to form thain large coalitions, and that a player who
has the ability to form powerful smai . coalitions will . eceive a larger
proportion of the payoff than players who must depend on many other players
to form a powerful coalition. The model's predictions for the previous
study were quite good; a monopolist opposed by 2 weaker players was pre-
dicted to receive 67% of the payoff. The results, over all conditions,
indicated that the monopolist received about 65% of the payoffs. For the
present study, the model predicts that the strong player's payoffs will
range from 89 to 92% as the number of weak players increases from 8 to 11.
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Another social psychological theory, Komorita and Chertkoff s (1973)
Bargaining the )ry, makes a different ;. ;t of predictions: given one mono-
polist and at least two weak players. Bargaining theory predicts that the
monopolist should receive 75% of the payoffs, regardless of the number of
wea>.er players. The predictions for the previous study were appropriate
in two of the six conditions, and those two conditions were predicted to
be among the most competitive. Because the theory assumes competitive
motivations on the part of the players, the data supported its predictions.
The present study, however, investigates an even more competitive situation.
Because Bargaining theory's prediction does not change with greater numbers
of weak players, this study provides a strong test of its predictions and
a strong test of its general applicability.
The final theory which the present study addresses has roots in both
social psychology and n-person game theory. While Pivotal Power theory is
based on the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) , it was first mentioned by •
Gamson (1954), A player's pivotal pov/er is determined by his ability to
bring pivotal resources to a coalitioi . Pivotal Power t.ieory predicts
that coalitions v.»hich minimize pivotal power will form, and that each
player's payoff will be proportional to his pivotal power. The theory has
fared poorly in most social psychological research (e.g. , Murnighan, Komorita,
and Szv;ajkowski, Note 2) . iiowover, in the present study, even though its pre-
dictions are based on an entirely different set of assiomptions. Pivotal
Power theory makes the same predictions as the Weighted Probability model.
In addition, not only does the data presented here have import for both the
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social psychological and the mathematical approaches to n-person bargaining,
the conflict situation which was studied also tends to bridge the gap that
has separated the two theoretical areas.
Method
Subjects . The participants in this study were 264 male undergraduates,
predominantly juniors, enrolled in an introductory organizational behavior
course at a Icirge midwestern university. Students completed part of a
course requirement by participating.
Design . Three factors were manipulated: (1) secret or announced pay-
off divisions; (2) the opportunity to send messages vs. no such opportunity;
and (3) secret or ajinounced offers (including the announcement of acceptances
and rejections of the offers). Although a complete factorial design would
have resulted in eight conditions, three of the eight conditions were not
conducted; all three included no announcement of the payoff division when
either messages were available and/or when the offers, acceptances, and
rejections we: ? announced. The five remaining conditiom, then, were: (1)
.secret payoff division-no-messages-secret offers; (2) cumounced payoff div-
ision-no messages-secret offers; (3) annoxinced payoff division-no messages-
announced offers; (4) announced payoff ^division-messages available-secret
offers; amd (5) announced payoff division-messages available-einnounced offers.
The design can be broken down into a 2 x 2 (messages and offers) design,
with an additional condition which allows for a test of the effects of not
announcing the payoff division.

Large Group Bargaining
a
The Game . The participants were put in a situation very similar to
the earlier study. The game was presented as a market consisting of 7 to
12 players, depending on the number of participants in each session (see
Table 1) . For each trial in the game, player A owned a right shoe while
Insert Tedile 1 about here
each of the other players owned a left shoe. Single shoes had no value,
but a pair of shoes (consisting of one right shoe and one left shoe) could
be sold for 100 points. Thus, no player acting alone could earn any income
from the market, but emy coalition of players which could assemble a pair
of shoes could earn 100 points. Player A thus controlled a monopoly on
right shoes. The game can be modeled in characteristic ftinction form where
N = (A,B,C,. ..,L) , v(A) = v(X) = v(XX) = ... =0, and v(AX) = v(AXX) = ... = 100,
where (1) X indicates one of the players in positions B through L; (2) XX
indicates two players in the positions B through L, and so on, and (3) v
indicates the value or payoff which the coalition identified inside the
parentheses could obtain.
The core or this game consists of the outcome at which player A
r'eceives 100 points, and the remaining players each receive points.
This outcome is also the unique competitive allocation of the game.
The Shapley value of the game playeU by no players and the prediction
100
of the Weighted Probability model give player A a payoff of 100 - —-— .
Note that as the number n increases, the predictions approach the core.
Procedure . The participants were given written instructions which
were also read aloud by the experimenter. The instructions presented
the game (described earlier) and the following (summarized) information:
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"Your task is to bargain among yourselves to determine who will sell their
shoes and how _iie sellers will divide heir payoff. We \.ill repeat this
procedure several times, with each player assuming the same position each
time." The players were then instructed in the mechanics of the experi-
ment. After reading these instructions, the experimenter went over several
examples to insure that each of the participants understood the rules and
mechanics of the game. Only after all the players expressed understanding
of the entire set of instructions did the procedure continue. This instrac-
tion phase typically consumed 30 minutes.
The players were seated in three adjoining rooms. No verbal communi-
cation wcis permitted. All players were separated from one another by
opaque partitions so that they could not determine the identity of any
of the players in any of the positions. The monopolist was in a small
room by himself. Each of the players' positions was randomly determined.
Each player filled out offer slips which consisted of the choice of a
bargaining partner and a proposed payoff division totalling 100 points.
The experimenter collected each of the players' offers. After all the
'players had submitted their offers, the experimenter recorded the trial
number and passed the offers to the appropriate players. Upon receiving
one or more offer slips, each player could accept at most one of the
offers. An agreement was defined to be reached when an offer was accepted.
However, when more than one offer was accepted, each player was bound to the
offer he had made; this means that if a player made an offer which was
accepted, he was held to that offer, even if he had accepted an offer for
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cunother agreement. The experimenter carefully explained to the players
that if a left shoe player received an offer from A and accepted it, he
would be included in the winning coalition. In addition, A could protect
himself from "mutiny" by accepting a two-person offer from any one of the
left shoe players. If his own offer were rejected, his choice of the left
shoe players' offers would determine the agreement. In cases where two
players accepted each other's offers but the payoff divisions were dif-
ferent, the average of the two payoff divisions was recorded. For offers
which included more than one other player, all players receiving the offer
were required to accept it if that coalition were to form. This procedure
(originally used by Komorita and Meek, Note 1) was repeated for seven com-
pleted trials or until time ran out.
In the secret payoff division conditions, the positions of the players
included in the agreements were announced. In the announced payoff division
conditions, the points won by each of the coalition members were also
announced. When this division was announced, there were often vocal
exclcunations by some of the players. The experimenter's instruction to
formulate the next offer usually quieted any commotion. In addition,
none of the players seemed to communicate nothing other than surprise
in these situations. *
In the "offers cinnounced" conditions, the offers, acceptances, and
rejections of the monopolist were announced over an intercom system. The
offers of the left shoe players, if directed only to the monopolist, were
not announced individually; rather, the range of offers by the left shoe
players to the monopolist were announced. All offers which included the
monopolist and more than one of the other players were announced as well.
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In addition, the individual responses of the left shoe players to the
monopolist's of ers (i.e., their accept nces and rejectioi s) were announced.
In the groups where messages were allowed, the players were allowed to
send any communications they wished. The monopolist could send a message to
euiy of the left shoe players individually. The left shoe players, however,
could send messages either to the monopolist or to all of the other left shoe
players. To sin^slify procedures, individual communications between left shoe
players were not allowed. When a message was sent to all the left shoe players,
it was read over the intercom to the two rooms which housed the left shoe
players. In order to insure that the monopolist did not hear the messages
of the left shoe players, low volume white noise was broadcast into his
room. (All of the monopolists in this condition reported that they had not
heard any of the announcements which the experimenter read over the inter-
com at the start of each bargaining session. ) In the conditions where pay-
offs, offers, acceptances, or rejections were announced, the experimenter
personally delivered this information to the monopolist.
Results
Although 26 groups participated in the study, the data from three of the
groups (one each in the second, fourth, and fifth conditions) were not
<
included in -the analysis because they did not complete 7 trials. In one of
the groups the monopolist made several proposals to more than one of the
left shoe players which were not accepted. This resulted in several
rounds which did not result in agreements. The other two groups can be
characterized by the large nvimber of messages which were sent in each
group. In addition, the monopolist in one group expressed confusion with
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the procedure and tended to be very slow in making his offers, while the
members of the other group sent a larg^ number of "all injluded" proposals.
In both cases, time expired prior to the fourth trial.
The data from these three groups was insufficient for normal statis-
tical .analysis. However, the agreements which were reached were quite
similar to those obtained in the other sessions.
The remaining data were analyzed with the monopolist as the central
focus. In particular, the major dependent variables in the analyses included
the monopolist's payoffs and demands, and the highest and lowest offers he
received. Due to the fact that the left shoe players were never able to
form an effective blocking coalition which substantially reduced the mono-
polist' s payoffs, the only variable in the analyses which focused on the
left shoe players was the number of times they proposed an agreement which
included all of the players in the game.
The analysis of the dependent variables associated primarily with the
monopolist took two directions. The first analyzed the effects of information
on his payoffr. , demands, etc. In particular, these analyses used the three "no
liiessage" conditions to test the effects of increasing information on the bar-
gaining processes and outcomes; separate 3x7 (information by trials) analyses
of variance were conducted for the four dependent variedales mentioned above.
The second direction tciken by the analyses focused on the impact of
the two message conditions in conjunction with the two offer conditions
(and the seven trials) . Separate 2x2x7 (messages by offers by trials)
analyses of variance were conducted for each of the dependent variables.
In each case, the trials variable was restricted to trials where agreements
were reached; this avoids missing payoff data and disparate levels of the
trials variable.
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The distributions of the monopolist's payoffs, demands, and highest
offers were ne'-'atively skewed in each "^f the conditions. Each of these
variables, then, was transformed prior to analysis using the appropriate
3
log transformation (Winer, 1962). In reporting the means for each of
the analyses, the means of tho transformed scores were retrans formed.
This second treu^sformation results in move appropriate estimates of the
central tendencies of the distributions involved. In each of the tables
and figures, then, the means have all been retransformed (adjusted).
Main effects for trials were significant in each of the analyses for
the monopolist's payoffs, demands, highest and lowest offers. Table 2
displays the adjusted means for each of the variables (the means for low-
est offers were not adjusted) siunmed over all five conditions, and clearly
Insert Table 2 about here
shows a continuous increase in payoffs, demands, and highest offers over
trials, and a 'continuous decrease in .lowest offers over trials. This
same effect was found in each of the subsequent analyses, indicating a
consistently dynamic bargaining process in each of the conditions.
These findings are d!unaging to Bargaining theory, the VJeighted
Probability model, and Pivotal Power theory. None of tliese models pre-
dicts such an. increase in the monopolist's payoffs as the trials progress.
The findings do support the notion that the bairgaining was moving toward
the competitiva equilibrium, the core. As the trials progressed, the
rwnopolist' s payoffs continuously approached the entire 100 points.
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In the analysis of the in5>act of information, the only effect to reach
significance were the trials main effects, mentioned above. For the strong
player's payoffs, deaiands, highest offers, and lowest offers, the information
main effects and interactions revealed no significant findings. In addition,
a separate test of the offectK of the announcement of the payoffs resulted
only in a significant, trials main effect.
The analysis which focused on the impact of message availability (paired
with the different offer conditions) did result in several significant effects.
Table 3 displays the adjusted means, the P-ratios and the £-values for the
Insert Table 3 about here
significant messages main effects for the monopolist's payoffs, demands, and
highest offers. In each case, the no message conditions favored the monopo-
list. In addition to these main effects, there were significant interactions
between messages and trials for the strong player's payoffs and highest offers:
P (6,72) = 2.24, £ < .05 and F (6,72) « 3.00, £ < .05, respectively. Table 4
depicts both interactions. Post hoc tests using the Newman-Kuels procedure
Insert Table 4 about here
(Winer, 1962) indicated that, for highest offers, there were no significant
differences in the messages conditions, but that the highest offers for the
first trial were significantly less than the highest offers for the last
trial in the no message conditions. For A's payoffs, there were again no
differences across trials within the messages conditions; when there were
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no messages, however, A's payoff on the first trial was significantly less
than his payof s on the last three tri Is.
The results cited above are not strictly independent from one cinother.
The monopolist's payoffs, demands, and highest offers are correlated with
one another to a high degree. For instance, it is not surprising that A,
who holds a position of considerable power, could make increasingly high
demands, and in roost cases expect to continue receiving high payoffs. His
payoffs and demands, overall conditions, were highly correlated:
4(161) = .85, £ < .0001. The correlations within each of the conditions
were consistently high, especially in the later trials. Although A's
highest offers were also highly correlated with his payoffs [r(161) = .60,
£ < .0001], the relationship is not quite as strong. To get a clearer
picture of the iir5)act of the independent variables, a multivariate analysis
of variance was conducted with messages, offers, and trials (2x2x7) as
independent variables and A's payoffs, demands, and highest offers as
dependent variables. As before, the trials main effect was significant:
P (18, 198) = _.27, £ < .001. The onl^ other effect which approached
significance was the messages main effect: F (3, 10) - 2.70, £ < .10.
The step-down F-ratio for the effects of A's payoffs over the effects
of A's demands, was less thari 1.00, indd.cating the dependence of the
monopolist's payoffs on his demands rather than on the high offers he
received. The relationship between his demands and payoffs is so strong
that one can almost conclude that he could obtain any payoff he wished.
The proportions of "all included" proposals sent by the left shoe
4
players were treinsformed prior to analysis (Winer, 1962). Analyses of
variance resulted in significant trials and messages main effects:
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F (6, 108) = 7.25, £ < .00001 and F (1, 12) = 5.94, £ < .05, respectively.
No other main effects and no interactions were significauit. For each of
the trials, there were 212 opportunities for left shoe players to propose
an "all included" coalition. The actual frequencies of "all included"
proposals for the 7 trials were 1, 6, 17, 20, 32, 37, and 32. The increase
from the first through the fifth trials is fairly dramatic. For the mes-
sages effect, there were 29 "all included" proposals in 511 opportunities
in the no message groups, and 99 "all included" proposals in 504 opportun-
ities in the messages groups. These results indicate the possiblity of a
causal chain, starting at message availability and leading to increased
"all included" proposals. This may lead to a damping effect on A's pay-
offs, rhe present data support the first link in this chain. Further
research is necessary to support the second.
An analysis of the number of "all included" offers by the left shoe
players investigated possible relationships with the monopolists' outcomes.
There were no significant correlations between the number of "all included"
proposals and A's payoffs or demands, but the number of "all included" pro-
posals were negatively correlated with the highest offers A was receivings
r = -.19, £ < .01. Again, this finding indicates the effects which the
monopolist's demands had on his outcomes. Even though the highest offers
he received were lower when there were meuiy "all included" proposals, his
payoffs and demands were not significantly affected.
The final analysis concerned the effects which the unequal numbers
of players in the groups may have had on the results. Correlational anal-
ysis between the nutitoer of players and the dependent variables revealed no
significant relationships.
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To summarize the results, the findings indicated that: (1) The
monopolist's fxyoffs and demands, the lighest offers he eceived, and the
number of "all included" proposals made by the left shoe players all
increased over trials. (2) Announcement of the offers had no significant
effect. (3) The availability of messages reduced the monopolist's pay-
offs, demands, and highest offers. In addition, when messages were not
available, the monopolist's payoffs and the highest offers he received
increased over trials; when messages were available, there was only a
minor, insignificant increase over trials. (4) There was a strong positive
relationship between the monopolist's demands and his payoffs. A similar,
but less strong relationship was found between his payoffs and the highest
offers he received. (5) More "all included" proposals were made by the
left shoe players in the message conditions. The number of "all included"
proposals was negatively correlated with the highest offers received by
the monopolist. (6) The number of players was not significantly corre-
lated with the dependent variables.
Discussion
Comparisons between the four theoretical formulations and the
observed data are quite striking. Whereas, in the previous study, the
monopolists' payoffs tended to support 'the social psychological theories,
the results in the present study move very close to the core.
It is somewhat incongruous that, even though the data revealed increases
in the monopolist's payoffs over trials, the Bargaining theory (which
normally predicts just such a change) makes a static prediction which
becomes more and more inaccurate as the trials progress. The predictions
of the Weighted Probability model and Pivotal Power theory approximate
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the monopolist's payoffs, especially in the conditions where messages were
allowed. The increasing nature of tht monopolists payoffs, however, is at
variance with the two models' predictions. Overall, the game theoretic
concept of the core seems to be the most appropriate depiction of the
actual progression of the monopolist's payoffs, especially in the no mes-
sage conditions. Indeed, the magnitude of the results is quite striking.
What is even more striking than the means of the monopolist's payoff dis-
tributions is the fact that in 52 of the 105 no message trials, he received
99 of the 100 points, or more. Player A held a very powerful position, and
the strong positive relationship between his demands and payoffs further
testifies to his power.
While the magnitude of the present data differs markedly from that of
the previous study, the effects caused by the different conditions were
quite similar. In this particular game, the competition among ten weaker
players was sufficient to drive the results to the core. In both studies
the cheuige in conditions caused the outcomes to shift along one parameter
curve, of the sort described by solutions (von Neumann-Morgenstem, 1944)
.or subsolutions (Roth, 1976b) to the cooperative game. Indeed, the fact
that both this study and the previous study (Murnighan and Roth, 1976),
which used a decidedly different situation (only three players) , found
similar resiilts leads to greater confidence in their validity.
The opportunity to send messages resulted in lower payoffs, demands,
and high offers for the monopolist compared to the no message conditions.
As before, the number of "all included" proposals increased when messages
were allowed. It is interesting to note, however, th&t "all included"
offers seem to act as messages when messages are not allowed. As soon
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as one individual sent an "all included" offer, everyone had the opportunity
to see that A'j payoffs might be reduc id. This differed from the earlier
study, where "all included" offers often were disregarded by the other weak
player. In the present study, the probability that some other left shoe
player might choose the 3^lme strategy on the next trial increased, if only
because there were more players.
In addition, in the two groups where the monopolist initiated the "all
included" proposals, "all included" coalitions were not successful. Instead,
the monopolists in these two groups might be characterized as "frustrated
benevolents . " Of the 15 left shoe players who received these offers (9 in one
group, 6 in the other) , only 5 accepted. It seems that the left shoe players
were either unwilling to pursue a "cooperative" strategy or were unwilling
to trust the other players to also agree. Given that all but one of the weak
players responded with proposals including only A and themselves on the sub-
sequent trials, the first alternative seems to be correct. A norm may be
prevalent, at least in the early trials, to attempt to establish two-person
agreements including yourself and the strong player and no one else. This
hypothesis, however, should be tested in future research.
The messages in this study also seemed to fulfill a different function
from the messages in the three-person study. Whereas the messages in the
previous study were almost exclusively task-related (for instance, "Let's
both offer and accept only 50-50 agreements"), the messages in the present
study fulfilled additional functions. While they often urged the other
players to adopt a unified front, after several attempts to block the mono-
polist had failed, majiy of the messages seemed to be sent simply to relieve
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tension. Messages like "I'm getting out of the shoe business. It's
apparent that I don't have but one foc c to stand on." we :e quite comraon
in the later stages of the game.
In addition, messages were often used to double cross the other left
shoe players. On most occasions when tliere was a concerted effort to hold
to "all included" proposals, at least one of the left shoe players would
send a message to A to inform him of this development, in the hope that
he might negotiate an individually rex^arding agreement.
The data from this study lead to questions concerning the generali-
zability of social psychological theory in complex n-person bargaining
situations. While earlier reports (cf., Komorita, 1974) tended to sup-
port both Bargaining Theory and the Weighted Probability model, more
recent results (Murnighan, Romorita, and Szwajkowski, Note 2) are not so
clear-cut. The present study adds to this confusion by considering yet
another variable, communication opportunities, in a game which includes
a monopolist. Although a situation where one person has veto power is at
variance with Gamson's (1961) original definition of a "full-fledged coali-
"tion situation," the bargaining processes in such a situation are not unim-
portant. As the authors argued in a previous paper (Murnighan and Roth,
1976), a taxonomy of gamey which takes -into consideration both psychological
and mathematical variables is sorely needed, for the generalizability of
models in both game theory and in social psychology can be questioned. The
present study certainly adds more weight to this argument.
Conclusions
The present study obtained findings which indicated that a single
monopolist in a large group can and will obtain large payoffs from the
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other group members. In particular, the extreme magnitude of his payoffs
and the fact taat the monopolist's pa^ jffs increase over time compare very
favorably with the game theoretic notion of tl-^e core, while three social
psychological models, the Weighted Probability model (Koroorita, 1974),
Bargaining theory (Komorita and Chertkoff , 1973) , and Pivotal Power theory
(Gamson, 1964), do not make such accurate predictions. In addition, the
results indicate that the monopolist received significantly lower payoffs
when the players had the opportunity to sand messages to one another.
When compared to a previous study which investigated three-person groups,
the present study indicates that increasing the group size increased both
the power and the payoffs of the strong player f and that the dynamics of
the communication process changed through the use of several differ-ent
types of messages.
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Footnotes
1. Bargaining Theory's predictions uses the distribution of resources
(usually votes) among the players to determine each bargainer's
ejcpected maximum outcome. While the present study did not use a
resource distribution, predictions can be derived if one assumes
that the monopolist's expected maximum outcome is 100 points.
2. Keeping the payoff division secret, for instance, is impossible when
every player's offers, acceptances, and rejections are einnounced.
In addition, making messages available without announcing the payoff
division may have confounded the information exchange between
conditions.
3. For the positively skewed dependent variable, x' = ln(x).
For the negatively skewed dependent variables, x' = ln(101 - x)
-
4. The scores used in the analysis were
_
/ number of "all included" proposals
V niimber of opportunities for "all included" proposals
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Table 1. The Size of the Groups in Each of the Conditions.
Payoff Division
Secret
No Messages
Messages
Available
7, 10, 10, 11,
11, 11, 12, 12
Payoff Division ' Offers
Announced
10, 11, 12, 12
9, 10, 11, 11
Announced
7, 9, 9, 11
8, 10, 11, 11
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Table 2 . Adjusted Mean Payoffs, Demands, Highest Offers, and liOwest Offers
for the Trials Main Effects over All Five Conditions, with Corresponding
F-rations and £-values.
TRIALS
Payoffs
Demands
Highest
Offer
Lowest
Offer
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 F* P<
85.6 90.7 93.4 95.3 96.0 96.0 95.5 7.85 .00001
89.3 92.1 94.8 95.8 96.0 96.7 96.5 5,46 .0001
95.5 96.5 97.8 97.9 98.0 98.2 99.0 5.47 .0001
34.3 27.8 35.7 22.6 26.4 16.8 15.8 3.33 .005
These means are not adjusted. The underlying distribution for this
variable was not significcuitly different from a normal distribution.
*df = 6, 108
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Table 3 . The Adjusted Means, F-ratios, and p-values for the Significant
Main Effects for Messages
No Messages Messages
1
— , ...
E^
Payoffs 96.3 89.8 5.48 .05
Deroeuids 95.9 89.0 5.96 .05
Highest Offer 98.63 94.53 8.30
- —
.05
*df = 1
,
12
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Table_4. The Adjusted Means for the Significant Messages by Trials
Interactions for the Strong Player's Highest Offers and Payoffs.
Dependent
Variable Condition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Highest
Offer
No
Messages 95.0b^e 96.1 ^abc 98.9 ^abc 99.2 ^ab 99.3 ^ab 99.3 ,ab 99.7a
Messages 93.4
c
95.1
be 93.8b^e 93.6c 94.3b^e 94.6b^e
f
96.5 .
abc
layoffs
No
Messages 85.1
^cd abed abed 97.6 ^abc 98.3 ^ab 98.1 ^ab 98.6a
Messages 82.0d^ bed 90-9 ^ ^abed 98.9 ^ ^abed abed 92.4 ^ ^abed abed
lote: Cells with common £Jiobscripti3, within the set foj
— S u. 1
r each dependent variable, are
1
not
significantly different from one another at the .05 level using the Newman-Kuels
procedure
.
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